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Abstract 
This paper makes a first attempt to allow for three types of 
different exits for listed companies to leave the public market. 
Using a competing risk model, we find that different firm 
characteristics lead to different forms of exits. We also show that 
firms with high profitability and growth are more inclined to go 
private while firms with low profitability and growth are more 
likely to suffer bankruptcy. Our results can be viewed as an 
important supplement to Fama and French (2003). Using our 
model, one is able to test different existing hypotheses for going 
private. We provide strong empirical support to the free cash flow 
hypothesis. Some evidence for the undervaluation hypothesis is 
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1. Introduction 
The survival of public firms has attracted academic interest in recent years. Fama and 
French (2001) document that although the number of firms listed on the major US 
stock markets jumps from 156 per year for 1973-1979 to 549 per year for 1980-2001, 
more than two in five (44.1%) are delisted within ten years. Fama and French (2003) 
attribute the sharp decline in the survival rates of American listed companies to their 
involving characteristics (more left-skewed profitability and more right-skewed 
growth rate). Recently, there is a rich body of empirical studies, spanning numerous 
countries and time periods, attempting to infer the relationship between a listed firm's 
fundamentals and its survival. However, rare attempts have been made to examine the 
relationship between a firm's fundamentals and different forms of exits. A listed firm 
may fail to survive as a public entity for various reasons. The firm might be acquired 
by or be merged with another operating company. The firm can also choose to go 
private through a leveraged buyout. Alternatively, the firm might suffer bankruptcy or 
be liquidated. However, the existing literature does not distinguish different modes of 
exits. This paper adds to the literature by focusing on how, if at all, a listed firm's 
fundamentals influence its odds of going bankrupt, being M&A, and going private. A 
competing risk model (Dolton and van der Klaauw, 1999; Wheelock and Wilson, 
2000) is employed to analyze the determinants influencing the life span of listed firms 
under different forms of exits. 
Among the three possible reasons of exiting the public market, the public-to-private 
(PTP) transactions play a major role in recent years'. Opler and Titman (1993) 
estimate that there are over 2000 leveraged buy-out (LBO) valued in excess of $250 
billion in the American market between 1979 and 1989. Weir et al. (2005a) reveal a 
rising trend of the PTP transactions in the UK during the late 1990s. In Hong Kong, 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, about 12% of all the public firms are delisted. 
Among these delisted firms, firms going private constitute a large percentage of about 
48%. In this paper, apart from investigating the relationship between a firm's 
fundamentals and its survival rate, we also use our model to test the existing 
hypotheses for the going-private transactions. There are several competing hypotheses 
for the PTP transactions in the literature. The "Free Cash Flow" hypothesis is the 
leading argument explaining the motivations behind the public-to-private transactions. 
It states that companies have a proclivity to abusively spend the free cash flow on 
negative NPV projects which dissipates the wealth of shareholders and thereby 
creates a source of premiums to be paid by taking a firm private. Jensen (1986a) 
characterizes those companies that exit the market through the PTP transactions as 
"firms and divisions of larger firms that have stable business histories and substantial 
free cash flow (i.e., low growth prospects and high potential for generating cash 
flows)~situations where agency costs of free cash flow are likely to be high" (p.325)^. 
‘According to FactSet Mergerstat, there is a dramatic increase in recent private equity acquisitions. 
These transactions accounted for approximately 31.7% of public takeovers in 2005，up from 26.3% in 
2004. It is estimated that private equity has grown 3000% in the past 10 years. 
2 Firms without growth prospects have fewer opportunities to reinvest the cash flow profitably in their 
current business. Given high potential cash flows, the management has incentives to dissipate free cash 
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An important symptom identified by Jensen (1986b) is that the PTP transactions are 
often financed by borrowing�. The previous studies give mixed empirical evidence for 
the free cash flow hypothesis. Lehr and Poulsen (1989)，Denis (1992) and Opler and 
Titman (1993) support the free cash flow hypothesis, while Maupin et al. (1984)， 
Servaes (1994)，Kieschnick (1998) and Weir and Laing (2002) argue that the free cash 
flow hypothesis cannot explain the public firms' decisions to go private. 
Another popular explanation is the tax incentive hypothesis, which states that 
public-to-private transactions are motivated by the tax savings associated with these 
transactions4. Kaplan (1989b), Newbould et al. (1992) and Halplem et al. (1999) show 
that the tax benefits significantly influence the decision to go private，. 
The undervaluation hypothesis, which provides a new perspective on the PTP 
transactions, is a newly emerging hypothesis proposed by Weir et al. (2005b). It states 
that public corporations with poor stock performance are not attractive to institutional 
investors. As a result, they usually suffer from thin trading and severe depression in 
stock prices. Given the soundness of financial performance, the management will 
perceive that the market undervalues their firms. Driven by this perception, they may 
flows in diversified projects and to pursue ambitious expansions in order to justify their great 
remuneration packages (Murphy, 1985). The decision to go private can be viewed as a vehicle to 
mitigate these agency problems. 
3 Because the penalty of defaulting debt payment is more severe than dividend cuts, debt creation can 
force the management to pay out large parts of fiiture cash flow in the form of coupon payments on the 
debt rather than to invest it unprofitably. Thus, debt reduces the agency costs of free cash flow by 
reducing the cash flow available at the discretion of the management. 
4 For example, the tax deductibility of interest payments on corporate debts and the increased 
depreciation deductions in tax payment. 
5 Other proponents of the tax incentive hypothesis include Lowenstein (1985) and Marais et al. (1989). 
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privatize the firms to reap the potential benefits of the undervalued assets. 
Our competing risk model will be used to test the aforementioned hypotheses for the 
public-to-private transactions. The paper is structured as follows: The next section 
introduces the competing risk model. Section 3 presents the data and describes the 
covariates used in the model. Section 4 reports the estimations results of the Cox PH 
model and the competing risk model. Section 5 summarizes our findings. 
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2. Methodology 
Suppose that firm i can leave the security market by one of the three possible routes 
(delisted for bankruptcy, being merged and going private)^. We observe the time to 
exit ti and the exiting route j, where j = 1 corresponds to hazard of bankruptcy, j = 2 
corresponds to hazard of being merged and y = 3 corresponds to hazard of going 
private. Corresponding to each possible risk there is a latent duration 7}，which is 
interpreted as the time which would elapse before the spell ends via route j, in the 
absence of any other risks which might cause the spell to end before this time. Thus, 
the actual exit time and exit route can be interpreted as the realizations of random 
variables T and J defined as: 
r = min(r.,y = 1,2,3) 
y = argmin^.(r^.,; =1,2,3) 
At each point in time, the hazard function for risky is: 
?x{t<T <t + ^t,J = jT>t) 
XAt) = lim • 
J ^ ) A/—0 A? 
Given our competing risk framework and independent treatment of the different 
hazards, the overall hazard function can be written as 
6 In Wheelock and Wilson (200)，they consider a competing risk model for the US banks facing two 
different risks. 
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冲) = i>y(0， 
y=i 
where A,, Aj, A3 are the cause specific hazard functions for bankruptcy, being 
merged and going private respectively. Consider the risk specific hazard function with 
Cox proportional hazard type: 
入 J丨 (0，Pj)=Aoy ( 0 e x p [ 4 (0/?； ]， a = 1 , 2 , 3 •) 
where X^j is the baseline hazard function specific to type j hazard at time t, Xj^{t) is 
a vector of time dependent covariates for firm i specific to type j hazard at time t, Pj 
is the vector of unknown regression parameters to be estimated. Then the partial 
likelihood function for each specific hazard j is: 
where kj refers to the number of firms in specific hazard j, and � < • • < denotes 
the kj ordered failures of hazard j. R(J�)={l\tj, > tj] is the set of firms that have 
not left the security market at time ？力..The likelihood fimction for the Cox CRM is 
LiB B / ? ) - n n e x p K . � , )代 ] 
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The model is semi-parametric in the sense that the vector p can be estimated 
without imposing any assumption regarding the baseline hazard function via the 
definition of the proper partial likelihood function. Comparing with Cox PH model, 
parametric procedures require the exact form of X^j {t). The inappropriate choice of 
hazard function will affect the reliability and stability of the estimates (Heckman and 
Singer, 1984). 
As the baseline hazard function varies only over time but not across firms, the 
unobserved heterogeneity of individuals will influence the soundness of the baseline 
hazard. To incorporate the unobserved heterogeneity into our model, we extend the 
Cox CRM by including a multiplicative term v^ so that 
又Jj it\Xj (t), p丨)=义oy. (0 exp[x；, {t)Pj ]Vj.， 
where Vj. is the denotation of risk specific and unobserved individual effect. We 
assume that the unobserved heterogeneity is independent with the observed 
characteristics and follows a Gamma distribution with unit mean and variance theta. 
The marginal effect of the covariate can be obtained by differentiating the hazard 
function: 
7 It is a commonly used functional form to improve the heterogeneity problem in CRM model by 
Manton (1986)一the exponential mean with a multiplicative error. Manton (1986) states that if the 
hazard function is well specified, then the precise parametric specification of the heterogeneity 
distribution is relatively innocuous. 
7 
If pkj > 0，then an increase in will increase the probability of a firm to leave the 
public security market for a certain destination state j. Furthermore, we are also 
interested in the impact of a change in a covariate on the probability of exit via route j 
comparing with other exits. Note that the probability of exiting via route j conditional 
on existing at time t is given by 
D r . , m ^i{t\xj{t\Pj) 
!：„=,々 (和“⑴，凡） 
The sign of the partial derivative d?r[j\t,x,^]/ dx'^j depends on all the parameters in 
the model. In the proportional hazard model, if /3'] > ^ j , the sign of the 
partial derivative d?r[j\t,x,j3]/dx] is positive (Thomas, 1996). In other words, an 
increase in / will increase the conditional probability of exiting via route j comparing 
with other types of exits if the estimated coefficient in Aj is larger than the 
corresponding coefficients in all other hazard functions. 
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3. Data 
3.1 Data Description 
The main data used for this survival analysis, including the data of individual listed 
firms and macroeconomic data, are obtained from the Hong Kong data profile of the 
Pacific-Basin Capital Markets (PACAP) database. The annual balance sheet and 
income statement for each firm are gathered from the Financial Statement File of the 
PACAP, while the history of individual firms, including the establishment, the date of 
exit and the stock performance are retrieved from the Monthly Stock Price and 
Returns File. The security market size and market performance are collected from the 
Key Economic Statistics File, the Monthly Market Returns File of PACAP and the 
annual reports of listed firms. Our data set consists of all public corporations that are 
actively traded in the Hong Kong security market at the beginning of 1981 and each 
of them is followed up to the year when it exits from the stock market, or until the end 
of our study period (2001/, whichever comes first? We exclude spin-offs, firms that 
go public after going private and firms that are relisted in other countries^®. 
8 The sample covers the main expansionary period of the Hong Kong financial market and the 
financial crises of 1987 and 1997, as well as a period of gradual transition of regulatory and governing 
policies in late 1980s. Both the implementation of the deregulation policy in the late 1980s and the 
following financial crisis in 1997 contribute to an accelerating wave of restructuring and consolidation 
among the existing firms in Hong Kong. Consequently, this gives us a unique opportunity to observe 
how the listed companies exit the market (bankruptcy, M&A, going private). In addition, Hong Kong 
experienced an important change in political environment when the British government handed over 
the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China. This political event has an impact on the security market. 
9 The first fiscal year of PACAP database is 1980. 
A large proportion of Hong Kong listed firms decide to leave the Hong Kong market and relist on 
other security markets such as the Singapore market for political reasons. As there is no change in the 
firms' attributes in this process, we exclude them from our samples. 
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In this paper, the date of exit is defined by the official announcement date of the 
delisting process instead of the actual reorganization dateii. To further explore the 
delisting pattern, we classify the exits into three categories (bankruptcy, M&A，and 
going private). In the case of bankruptcy, the firm is trapped by a legally declared 
inability or impairment of ability to pay its creditor, or it is forced by the HKSE or 
other governing authorities' deregulatory actions to delist. Those different possibilities 
are denoted by B, C, and D of company status remarks in the PACAP. M&A refers to 
the firms that merge with another operating company or that are acquired by another 
public listed company. The status codes of the company are M, T and D. A 
going-private transaction is defined as one that converts a free-standing, publicly 
traded corporation into a privately held corporation, which is marked by P and D in 
the PACAP 12. After disregarding the companies that lack complete accounting 
information, we have 748 companies in total. Among them, 89 companies disappear 
in the security market before 2001 and the remaining 659 observations are treated as 
right-censored. Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the durations for different 
types of exiting firms, while Table 2 provides detailed information about the 
distribution of exit for each year. 
Table 1 Summary Statistics on Listed Firms' Duration 
“Because there is a long time placement for the stock of any delisting transaction required by the 
HKSE, the actual date of reorganization may give a misleading and prolonged survival period of the 
delisted companies. 
12 The detailed description of the status codes of companies is presented in Appendix 1. 
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From Table 1, we can observe that during the sample period from 1981 to 2001, 748 
companies were trading in the Hong Kong security market and 89 of them choose to 
leave the market by 2001 for different reasons. Note that the mean and median of the 
firm's survival period are the shortest for firms going bankrupt, followed by firms 
being acquired or merged and firms going private. 
Table 2 Annual Summary Statistics on Listed Firms' Duration 
From Table 2，there are three special periods in which a large number of public firms 
are being delisted. These are 1989，1990 and 1 9 9 5 : 
Figure 1 Kaplan-Meier Estimates of Survival Function 
Figure 2 Kaplan-Meier Estimates of Hazard Function 
To examine the general distribution of exits, we begin with a preliminary analysis 
without explanatory variables, using the standard nonparametric Kaplan-Meier 
estimators. 14 Figures 1 and 2 show the estimated Kaplan-Meier survival function and 
13 The June 4th incident in 1989 plays an important role for the delisting transactions around 1989 and 
1990. The delisting surge around 1995 is due to the political reform introduced by Chris Patten, the last 
Governor of Hong Kong, which causes considerable annoyance to the PRC government. Furthermore, 
the Jardine Matheson Group, which was the largest conglomerate in Hong Kong, was delisted from the 
HKSE (Hang Seng Index) in 1994 and placed its primary listing in London. This was regarded as a 
vote of no confidence in the future of Hong Kong. Apart from the Jardine group, a good number of 
firms also relist in other security markets or go private. This explains to some extent why delisting 
transactions peaked in 1995. 
14 Suppose that the events occur at the discrete moments of t! ,h,..”tk. At period ti, n! firms are at risk 
and di firms exit. The Kaplan-Meier estimators of the hazard function and survival function are 
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hazard function, respectively, and summarize the results of this nonparametric 
analysis. As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, there are two periods where the public 
corporations experience a significant decline in their survival rates: one is around the 
seventh year and the other is around the fourteenth year. 
Figure 3 Comparisons of Survival Functions between Going private and 
Other Exits 
Figure 4 Comparisons of Hazard Functions between Going private and 
Bankruptcy 
Figure 5 Comparisons of Hazard Functions between Going private and M&A 
From Figure 3，we can see that the delisting hazards accelerate after the fifth year; 
however, the three types of exits have different survival patterns. The exit through 
going private shows a more dynamic survival pattern compared with other exits, and 
it also maintains two similar sharp changes around the seventh year and the fourteenth 
year. The overall survival rate for the PTP exits is lower than other exits. We also 
observe that the survival rates of the firms that go bankrupt or are being M&A are 
quite stable. From Figures 4 and 5, there is an overlapping in the hazard functions. At 
the initial stage (before the 6th year), more firms are forced to leave the market or 
U 小 [ 1 - 到 ， 
1， t<t, 
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merged with other firms and very few companies choose to go private. However, 
there is a booming of going-private transactions after the 6th year. 
3.2 Selection of Covariates 
Fama and French (2003) argue that a decrease in the profitability and a rise in the 
growth rate result in the sharp decline of survival rates of the American listed firms 
during 1973 and 2001. To test the conclusions of Fama and French (2003), we include 
two covariates, profitability and growth into our model. These measures are 
constructed in the same way as Fama and French (2003). 
Firm Profitability: We measure profitability E/A as the ratio of earnings before 
interest but after taxes to total assets^which measures the capacity of a firm's core 
business to generate earnings. 
Firm Growth: Following Fama and French's methodology, we define the growth of a 
firm as the growth rate of the firm's asset^^. This means that assets acquired via 
mergers are included, as are investments in short-term assets'^. Fama and French 
We calculate annual ratios as the aggregate value of the numerator divided by the aggregate value of 
the denominator. The results for each period are simple averages of annual values. Following Fama and 
French (2005), earnings before interest is income before extraordinary (PACAP item InclO) plus 
interest expense (PACAP item Hkf40), plus income statement deferred taxes (PACAP item Hkf 17) if it 
is available. Asset is PACAP data item Bal9. 
16 We calculate annual ratios as the aggregate value of the numerator divided by the aggregate value of 
the denominator. The results for each period are simple averages of annual values. Asset is PACAP 
data item Bal9. 
17 This measure is different from the sales growth that were frequently used in the free cash flow 
analysis by Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Weir et al. (2005a). 
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(2003) find that the growth has a negative impact on the firm's survival period. 
Free Cash Flow: The free cash flow is the cash flow in excess of what is required to 
fund all positive net present value projects (Jensen, 1986a). It is difficult to obtain a 
precise proxy for free cash flow because the firm's ex ante set of positive net present 
value projects is equivocal and hard to collect. Thus, different measures have been 
proposed (Gupta and Rosenthal, 1991; Opler and Titman, 1993). In this paper, we 
follow Lehn and Poulsen (1989) to calculate free cash flow as the net operating cash 
flow adjusted by the equity scale. This net operating cash flow is defined as 
CF = Income - Tax - Interests - Dividends, 
where 
Income = Operating income before depreciation, (PACAP item Inc5); 
Tax = Total income taxes, (PACAP item Inc7) minus change in deferred taxes from 
the previous year to the current year (PACAP item HkflV)； 
Interests = Gross interest expense on short- and long-term debt (PACAP item Hkf40); 
Dividends = Total dollar amount of dividends declared on common stock (PACAP 
item Mktl, Mkt2). 
CF evaluates post-tax cash flow that is not distributed to the security holders as either 
14 
interest or dividend payment'^. Under the free cash flow hypothesis, the proportion of 
a firm's assets consisting of free cash flow should be positively associated with the 
odds of going private, ceteris paribus. A positive relationship is expected between free 
cash flow and the decision to go private. 
Financial Leverage: Financial leverage can be measured as the ratio of the book value 
of the firm's long-term debt to the market value of its common stock. Jensen (1986a) 
argues that it is popular for the going-private transactions to utilize their debt 
capability, so LBO will convert the unstable expenses of stock dividend to stable 
interest expenses. This effectively restricts the management's abuse of free cash flow. 
We expect the going-private candidates to demonstrate less use of debt. 
Tax: Tax reduction is an important source of gains in the going-private transactions 
(Kaplan, 1989a; Newbould et al , 1992). We measure the effective tax liability for 
each company in our sample. The effective tax liability has been calculated as TAX 
item as above and we deflate TAX by the asset value to adjust for the firm size effect. 
Investment Expenditures: The free cash flow hypothesis argues that companies have a 
proclivity to abusively spend the free cash flow on negative NPV projects. According 
to this argument, we include the firm's level of investment expenditures into our 
model. We use a firm's expenditures on plant and equipment adjusted by the asset 
18 This whole construction of CF is similar to Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and the results for each period 
are simple averages of annual values. 
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value to control for the influence of size. If the gain of going-private transactions 
comes from the reduction of unprofitable investment expenditures, then the firms that 
will go private should maintain a higher level of investment expenditures compared to 
the M&A group and the firms remaining public. 
The q Proxy: The q proxy (or Tobin's q) compares the market value of a company 
with the value of her assets. It is calculated by dividing the market value of a 
company by the replacement value of its assets. This measure has several implications. 
If the market value solely reflects the recorded assets of a company, q will be equal to 
1. If q is greater than 1，it implies that the market value reflects some unmeasured or 
unrecorded assets of the company. We expect the going-private firms to have higher q 
values. Furthermore, the q proxy also indicates the analysts' view of the company's 
prospects. We obtain the market value of the company by discounting all the 
company's future cash flows, which are estimated by foreseeing the growth prospects 
of the company. A higher q value indicates that the firm has potentials in its business 
and that it maintains a promising prospect. Under the free cash flow hypothesis, firms 
with low growth prospects and high cash flow will be more likely to go private. Thus, 
we expect the q proxy to have a negative relationship with the odds of going private. 
Stock Performance: There is widespread anecdotal evidence that poor stock price 
performance causes a company to go private, which supports the perceived 
undervaluation hypothesis. Thus, stock performance is an important determinant in 
16 
our model. To adjust for the market trend, we study the value of the firm's stock 
performance relative to the market's return over the survival period ending one year 
prior to the first official announcement of takeover transactions. This avoids the 
potential contamination of stock price run-ups associated with takeover interest in the 
firm. Individual stock performance is measured by the average of the Monthly Return 
without Dividends obtained from the PACAP. The market return is measured by the 
Equally-Weighted Returns without Dividends'^. We also define a binary variable, 
which equals 1 if the stock beats the market, and equals 0 if the stock is 
underperformed. We include both the relative value proxy and the binary variable in 
our model. Firms with poor stock performance are not attractive to investors. 
Considering the high listing expenses and thin liquidity, a firm will prefer to go 
private. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between the stock performance 
and the hazard to go private. 
Firm Size: A wave of empirical studies has shown that small-scale firms have a lower 
likelihood of survival than their larger counterparts. This suggests that firm size 
should be an important covariate. Besides the logarithmic transformation of the total 
asset value, we also define the size of a firm as the percentage of her total asset 
relative to all the firms operating in the same industry. It should be noted that the 
mean of the size of firms going private is larger than that of firms from the bankruptcy 
sample and the M&A sample while the mean of the market share of firms going 
19 We also examine the alternative measures of stock performance and market return like Stock 
Monthly Return with Dividend, Equally-Weighted Market Returns without Dividend, or 
Value-Weighted Returns without Dividend. The results are robust to different specifications. 
17 
private is smaller. 
In addition to the aforementioned firm-specific variables, we also include two 
measures of market sentiment, the turnover of the market and the turnover of 
individual stock. These indicators can be used to analyze how the security market 
performs in different stages and to measure investor sentiment. More importantly, 
they can reflect the extent of speculation behavior. The fact that there are two 
financial crises during our sample period, and that the speculations in the stock market 
reach a peak before both financial crises, have a tangible influence on the public 
firms' survival patterns. 
Table 3 Proxies for Determinants of Listed Firms' Duration 
Table 4 Comparison of the Going-private and Public Samples 
Table 5 Comparison of the Going-private and Bankruptcy Samples 
Table 6 Comparison of the Going-private and M&A Samples 
The summary of these covariates is reported in Table 3. The table shows that there is 
a significant variation in firm-specific characteristics, which enables us to identify the 
effects of different determinants. Tables 4，5 and 6 compare the going-private sample 
and others (public firms, bankrupt firms and M&A firms). From Tables 4 and 5, it is 
found that the firms that go private have a higher profitability. From Table 4，the 
market condition variables, except the Stock Turnover, are all significant. From Tables 
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5 and 6，the differences of market condition variables between the going-private 
sample, the M&A sample, and the bankruptcy sample are obvious. Note that there is 
no evidence that the going-private firms have an increased investment expenditure. 
The test results in Tables 4，5 and 6 suggest that the stock performance of 
going-private firms is worsening. It signifies that stockholders of the going-private 
firms are experiencing wealth losses prior to the buyout, and the management will 
perceive this poor stock performance as an undervaluation of the company. 
Consequently, these firms are more likely to go private^®. Our tests reveal that firms in 
the going-private sample have poor stock performance, but they are more profitable 
and have a high level of free cash flow. These serve as evidence for the free cash flow 
hypothesis and the undervaluation hypothesis. 
20 Zingale (1995) also suggests that the share prices of a firm going private should weaken before the 
real transaction takes place. 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 General Survival Analysis by Cox Hazard Proportional Model 
Fama and French (2003) state that lower profitability and faster growth result in the 
plunge of the survival rate of firms during 1981-2001. In this section, we would like 
to verify the validity of these conclusions in the context of the Hong Kong security 
market. In particular, we analyze the relationship between the firms' attributes and 
their survival rates using different survival models^'. 
Table 7 Survival Distribution across Industries 
Table 7 reports the survival rates of different industries. It is clear that the survival 
rates are stable across different industries, especially in three main industries (Real 
estate, Consolidated, and Industrial) ^^. We study the impacts of firm-specific 
determinants on the survival rates via the parametric Exponential and Weibull models 
and the semi-parametric Cox proportional model^^ Table 8 reports the regression 
results for the Cox hazard function of 748 public corporations with different 
specifications. Table 9 displays the regression results for the Exponential and Weibull 
models. 
21 Our econometric techniques are more advanced than the sorting and cohort comparison methods 
used by Fama and French (2003). 
22 We do not include the financial industry because the measurements of financial performance and 
operation skills in the finance industry are totally different from other industries. 
“Writing the hazard function as A. (t,x) = ], recall the Exponential hazard assumes 
々乂(/)= constant = exp(« )，the Weibull model assumes e x p ( a , and the COX PH has 
no intercept and makes no assumption about the shape of the baseline hazard. 
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Table 8 Regression results for the Proportional Hazard Model {n = 748) 
Table 9 Regression results for the Exponential and Weibull Model without 
Heterogeneity 
In specification 1，profitability and growth are the main firm-specific factors. For all 
the models considered, the profitability and growth are both significant. Furthermore, 
the coefficient of growth has the expected sign as predicted by Fama and French 
(2003), while that of the profitability variable does not. The estimated coefficients of 
profitability are positive in all specifications, implying that the durations of firms with 
a higher level of profitability are shorter. The growth variable also has a positive 
estimated coefficient, which suggests that faster growing firms are more likely to 
leave the security market. The Exponential and Weibull models also confirm that the 
survival rates of public corporations are negatively related to their profitability and 
growth. Note that there is little variation of the estimates of profitability and growth 
across different models: the estimates for the coefficient of profitability in the Weibull 
and Cox models are respectively 17% and 5.5% higher in magnitude than that in the 
Exponential model, and the estimates for the coefficient of growth in the Weibull and 
Cox models are 9.6% and 9.5% higher in magnitude than that in the Exponential 
model, respectively. 
Figure 6 Survival Function Estimates by Profitability Status 
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Figure 7 Survival Function Estimates by Growth Status 
Figures 6 and 7 show that the survival rates are higher for firms with a lower profit 
(slower growth) than for firms with a higher profit (faster growth). For all the 
specifications considered in Table 8，the market turnover has a negative coefficient， 
indicating that hazard rates are lower when trading activities in the security market 
rise. Interestingly, we find that the turnover of an individual stock has a positive 
coefficient. 
In specification 2, we include both the stock return (absolute value) and the stock 
performance variable (a binary variable indicating if the stock beats the market). The 
stock return variable has a positive sign while the stock performance has a negative 
sign. The last column of Table 8 displays the results of the complete model with other 
firm-specific attributes besides growth and profitability. We find that the free cash 
flow, tax, q proxy, leverage, and investment expenditure have no apparent impact on 
the survival of firms. The insignificance of these firm attributes is due to the pooling 
of data. Note that the size variable has a significantly positive coefficient. This is 
different from the results of Mata et al. (1995) and Agarwal and Audretsch (2001), 
which unveil the negative relationship between the size of a firm and its failure. There 
are two possible reasons. One is that previous studies only pay attention to the initial 
size (or entry size) of new firms while we use the average size of the firm over the 
whole sampling period. Yet another reason is that large corporations in Hong Kong do 
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not receive particular protection from the government nor enjoy any privileges^"^. 
The previous results ignore the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. To take the 
unobserved heterogeneity into account, we allow for Gamma heterogeneity in our 
original Cox PH, Exponential, and Weibull models. Table 10 summarizes the 
estimates of all duration models with Gamma heterogeneity. 
Table 10 Regression Results from all Duration Models with Gamma 
Heterogeneity 
The coefficient estimates are different from what we have earlier in the absence of 
heterogeneity. Furthermore, the goodness of fit of the models, as reflected in the 
log-likelihood, has improved dramatically. Recall that the hazard with heterogeneity 
consideration is Zj (/, x) = Z^j (/) exp[x' {t)j3j and that Vj follows a Gamma 
distribution with unit mean and finite variance 0. The estimate of 0 is used to 
measure the degree of within-group correlation, and the model without heterogeneity 
is reduced to the standard model when <9= 0. In the Cox PH model with Gamma 
heterogeneity, we obtain an estimate of 9 = 2.5516, whose p-value of the 
likelihood-ratio test of Ho: (9= 0 is close to zero. This suggests the existence of 
heterogeneity. 
24 In most Asian countries, large corporations are mostly state-owned and they enjoy privileges and 
protection from government. Therefore, "too big to fail" is common in Japan and some Southeast Asian 
countries. 
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In essence, our results show that the profitable firms are more likely to become 
delisted. The market value has a positive influence on a firm's duration, indicating 
that more firms survive when the security market has a promising prospect. 
4.2 Competing Risk Analysis of Listed Firms 
The duration analysis in the previous section focuses on the listing spell, ignoring the 
reasons for the delistings. In this subsection, we conduct a competing risk analysis of 
firms listed in the Hong Kong security market between 1981 and 2001. We 
distinguish three different reasons for the delistings, namely, bankruptcy, M&A，and 
going private. 
Figure 8 The Baseline Survival Function of the Competing Risk Model 
Figure 9 The Baseline Hazard Function of the Competing Risk Model 
Figure 10 The Conditional Hazard Function of the Competing Risk Model 
Figures 8 and 9 present the annualized baseline hazard estimates for the three different 
exits. They all share a similar pattern with the Kaplan-Meier estimates in Figure 3, 
although they are smaller in magnitude. From Figure 10，we can see that the 
year-to-year variation does not follow any smooth parametric distribution. Thus, we 
estimate the baseline hazard semi-parametrically. 
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Table 11 Determinants of Firms' Survival (CRM Model without 
Heterogeneity) 
As most of the exits in our sample take the form of going private, it is therefore 
important to address the factors that may motivate these PTP transactions. The 
estimates for the standard Cox CRM model under two different specifications are 
reported in Table 11. In specification 1，we use the same variables as the Cox PH 
model to depict their differences directly. We check the robustness of these results by 
adding other firm-specific attributes to specification 2, which allows us to test 
whether the free cash flow or the tax incentive hypotheses can explain why firms go 
private. The estimated coefficients of the observed covariates, however, differ across 
various types of exits:，. 
We can see from Table 11 that the coefficient for profitability is significantly negative 
in the case of bankruptcy, while it has a positive coefficient in the case of going 
private and it is insignificant for firms being merged. These indicate that profitable 
firms are more likely to go private and less likely to go bankrupt. The previous 
literature did not consider different forms of exits. Using the CRM model, we develop 
a detailed picture of the relationships between profitability and the survival rate for 
different exits. We show that that fast growing firms are more likely to leave the 
25 Previous duration analysis on other topics found that parameter estimates may be biased when 
unobserved heterogeneity is not controlled for (Deng et al.，2000). We will take this into consideration 
in our model. 
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security market through takeovers while steadily growing firms have a higher chance 
of going bankrupt. Our results are important supplements to those ofFama and French 
(2003). 
Yet another important finding lies in the FCF variable. The coefficient for free cash 
flow is positive and significant for the going-private exit, while it is insignificant in 
the cases of bankruptcy and M&A. A rise in a firm's free cash flow significantly 
increases the probability of going private. This implies that a higher level of free cash 
flow may induce the management to undertake ambitious expansion plans or make 
personal appropriations. Our results are in line with those of Jensen (1989). 
We also examine the effect of the q proxy^^ in our CRM model. In specification 2, the 
negative coefficient in the case of going private implies that firms with less profitable 
future reinvestment opportunities are prone to going private. However, firms going 
bankrupt have positive coefficients for the q proxy. Firms with a higher q proxy are 
more likely to invest their capital in promising projects as they have more profitable 
growth prospects. However, large investments in these projects may lead to 
insufficient liquidity and overborrowing, both of which increase the risk of 
bankruptcy. 
Our model can also be used to test the undervaluation hypothesis. The negative 
26 It is used by Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Lehn et al. (1990) as a proxy for Jensen's free cash flow 
problems and management qualities. 
26 
coefficient of the q proxy in the case of going private reflects the fact that firms with 
lower market valuation prefer to go private. In addition, the stock performance 
variable has a negative sign, indicating that poor stock performance is an important 
reason for going private. Due to asymmetric information, the management of 
undervalued firms will choose to go private. Our results reveal that the undervaluation 
hypothesis can explain different types of exits. 
However, the results of leverage and investments are not significant in the CRM 
model. The tax variable is insignificant as well, so the tax incentive hypothesis cannot 
explain the PTP transactions. The size variable�？ is significantly positive for firms 
going private and firms suffering from bankruptcy. When we measure the size by 
another indicator (Market share), a significant positive coefficient is found in the case 
of M&A. By combining the results of these two measurements, we can cautiously 
conclude that size has a negative relationship with a firm's survival rate. 
The signs of the coefficients of the market condition variables are consistent with the 
results of the Cox PH model. The turnover of the market has a positive impact on the 
survival of firms. The turnover of individual stock is significant in the case of M&A 
with a positive coefficient while the results are insignificant for other exits. It 
confirms that excessively active trading activities (unusual price movements) of a 
single stock demonstrate serious speculation problems and hostile acquisition threats, 
27 We also try the square of size in our model, but it does not change the results. 
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which should be reflected directly by an exit through M&A rather than bankruptcy or 
going private. 
Table 12 Determinants of Firm's Survival (CRM Model with Heterogeneity) 
We estimate the competing risk model allowing for heterogeneity and the results are 
reported in Table 12. It is found that the main estimates are almost identical to those 
of the standard model. Furthermore, all the thetas, except for the going-private case in 
specification 1，are close to zero. Therefore, there are no strong heterogeneity 
problems in our model. 
4.3 Robustness Check 
To check the robustness of our conclusions, we examine the firms listed after 1980 
and repeat the same empirical analysis with these newly listed firms. In Table 13，we 
summarize the survival information for all new listed companies. Compared with the 
previous results, 171 firms which belong to seasoned firms (which have been listed in 
the market long before the starting time of our sample period) are removed. 42 
delisted firms pertaining to the group of seasoned firms, which occupy 47 percent of 
whole delisting samples, are also excluded. The summary statistics of this subsample 
are reported in Table 13. The estimation results are reported in Table 14, which are 
consistent with the results obtained with full samples. Thus, our results are robust to 
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the use of alternative samples. 
Table 13 Summary Statistics on New Lists' Duration 




This paper makes several important contributions to the corporate survival literature. 
First, it makes a first attempt to estimate the odds of different exits for listed firms. 
Using a sample of listed firms from 1981 through 2001, this paper has studied the 
survival patterns of firms listed in the Hong Kong security market and has identified 
the effects of a firm's fundamentals on its odds of different exits. We find evidence 
that the decisions of a corporation to remain public, go private, be acquired or go 
bankrupt depend on her financial characteristics. Second, the main fundamentals of 
public firms (profitability and growth) have different impacts on the odds of 
bankruptcy and of going private. We find that firms with higher profitability are more 
likely to go private and less likely to go bankrupt. As far as growth is concerned, the 
results are ambiguous. However, we show that firms with faster growth are more 
likely to be merged or privatized, which can be seen as an important supplement to 
Fama and French (2003), who argue that lower profitability and faster growth lead to 
a decline in listed firms' survival rate. Third, this paper provides strong empirical 
evidence for the free cash flow hypothesis. We find that firms with higher free cash 
flow and lower growth prospects have a high hazard of going private. Fourth, we also 
analyze the tax incentive hypothesis. As the tax variable is not significant in our 
model, the tax incentive hypothesis does not hold in the Hong Kong market. This is 
probably due to the low tax rate policy of the Hong Kong government (17.5% for 
profit tax). Last but not least, there are also some supporting results for the 
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undervaluation hypothesis that firms with poorer stock performance and lower 
valuation are more likely to go private. 
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Appendix I 
Status of Company (STATCO) 




C Compulsory delisting 
D Delisted, reason unknown 
G Changed to government owned 
M Merged with another company 
O Delisted due to company reorganization 
P Changed to private company 
R Company reclassified into another industry 
S Company under reorganization, data unavailable in PACAP 
T Acquired by another company 
Z Delisted, then relisting with the same company name 
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Appendix II: Summary of Companies Incorporated in New 
Locations from Hong Kong during 1992-1997 
New po^ . 
Name Incorporation Capital Sources Chairman 
Location 
Standard International Group Bermuda 1992-1-22 Chinese Capital Fung, Siu To Clement 
HKR International Ltd. J ^ t 二 ^ 1992-1-22 Chinese Capital Cha, Chi Ming 
= s o n Concepts (International) Bermuda 1992-2-18 Chinese Capital Dickson Poon 
Unison Knitting Factory Ltd. Bermuda 1992-3-17 Chinese Capital Ng, Chung 
S Z a ^ i f a f ^ Y f Holdings Bermuda 1992-4-28 Chinese Capital Chow, Kwen Lim 
二 g e 二 二 P = d i n g Bermuda 1992-4-14 Chinese Capital Hong, Wah Sang 
Asean Resources Ltd. Bermuda 1992-5-12 Chinese Capital NA 
Semi-Tech Microelectronics Inc. Bermuda 1992-6-30 Chinese Capital Ting, James Henry 
Polyson China Limited Bermuda 1992-7-7 Chinese Capital NA 
Supreme Investment Limited. 1992-8-11 Chinese Capital Chan, Po Fun Peter 
Wah Shing International Holdings Cayman 1992-8-11 Chinese Capital Ng, Hung San Robert 
TseSuiLuen Jewellery Bermuda 1992-9-2 Chinese Capital Tse, Sui Luen 
(International) Ltd. 
Herald (Hong Kong) Ltd. Bermuda — 1992-10-20 British Capital G. Bloch 
Tung Fong HungMedicine Co.Ltd 1992-10-21 Chinese Capital Chen, Hok Leung 
Ming Ren Investment & Bermuda 1992-11-24 Chinese Capital Sze, Ka Suen 
Enterprises Ltd. 
Axiom Forest Resources Bermuda 1992-12-15 Chinese Capital Hu, Fa Kuang 
S n S l d i n g s l T & B _ d a 1993-5-25 Chinese Capital Wong, Chi Fai 
Jademan (Holdings) Ltd. Bermuda 1993-6-16 Chinese Capital Wong, Yuk Lang 
China Investments Holdings Ltd. Bermuda 1993-9-14 Chinese Capital Leung, Siu Fai 
Stelux Holdings International Ltd. Bermuda 1995-2-21 Chinese Capital Wong, Chue Meng 
Giordano International Limited Bermuda 1995-5-29 Chinese Capital Lai, Tsz Ying 
Lucky Man Properties Ltd. Bermuda 1996-4-30 Chinese Capital Li, Chung Keung 
Asia Orient Holdings Ltd. Bermuda 1996-9-17 Chinese Capital Fung, Siu To Clement 
Brilliant View Holdings Ltd. Bermuda 1996-11-26 Chinese Capital Ych, Lim Por Yen 
Grande Holdings Ltd. Bermuda 1997-7-15 Chinese Capital Christopher"^ 
"Nam Pei Hong (Holdings) Ltd. Bermuda 1997-9-30 Chinese Capital Shum, Yuk Bui 
South China Strategy Investment Cayman 1997.10.14 Chinese Capital Ng, Hung San Robert 
Holdings Ltd. Islands 
T h e Kowloon Motor Bus Co.Ltd. Bermuda 1997-11-18 Chinese Capital Woo, Pak Chuen 
Sources: The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics on Listed Finns' Duration 
Existing Type Full Sample Bankruptcy M&A Private 
Failed 89 20 26 43 
Censored 659 
Mean 9.977273 8 9.346154 10.18605 
Median 9 7 8.5 10 
Min 1 3 3 3 
Max 20 20 19 20 
Std 6.043862 3.797506 3.887851 3.831299 
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Table 2 Annual Summary Statistics on Listed Firms' Duration 
Year Total Bankruptcy M&A Private 
i m 6 i 4 i 
1987 5 3 2 0 
1988 6 1 4 1 
1989 11 2 1 8 
1990 11 0 4 7 
1991 2 0 0 2 
1992 6 2 0 4 
1993 1 0 1 0 
1994 1 0 1 0 
1995 10 1 3 6 
1996 4 1 1 2 
1997 4 0 1 3 
1998 5 1 3 1 
1999 5 2 0 3 
2000 4 2 1 1 
200 1 8 4 0 4 
~ Sum 89 20 26 43 
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Table 3 Proxies for Determinants of Listed Firms' Duration 
Variable Definition and Construction Expected Sign Mean 
Bankruptcy M&A Going Private 
Profitability INC/A as the ratio of income before Negative Negative Negative 
interest and taxes to total assets, in percent Fama (2003) Fama (2003) Fama (2003) 0.0488 
Growth The growth rate of the firm's asset. Positive Positive Positive 
Fama (2003) Fama (2003) Fama (2003) 0.3607 
Tax Total income taxes, minus change in NA NA Positive 
deferred taxes from the previous year to the Tax 
current year, deflated by asset 0.0109 
Leverage Ratio of the book value of the firm's long NA NA Negative 
term debt to the market value of its FCF 
common stock 0.2876 
Investment Firm's expenditures on plant and NA NA Negative 
Expenditure equipment adjusted by asset FCF 0.2096 
Free Cash Flow CF = (Income - Tax - Interests - Dividends) NA NA Positive 
/ Equity FCF 
-0.1723 
q Ratio of the market value of a firm's NA Positive Negative 
common stock to its replacement value FCF & 
Undervaluation 1.8419 
Size Logarithm of total asset Negative Negative Negative 13.1688 
Stock Relative value of the firm's stock return to Negative NA Negative 
Performance market returns [Undervaluation [•0.0025 
Note: Expected signs are predicting results in accordance to different theoretical explanations. 
FCF stands for the free cash flow hypothesis, Tax stands for tax incentive hypothesis and 
Undervaluation stands for the undervaluation hypothesis. 
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Table 5 Comparison of Going-Private and Bankruptcy Samples 
Private Sample Public Sample 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. t-value 
Profitability 0.2255 0.2451 0.0405 0.1415 -7.8420*" 
Growth 0.5299 0.8088 0.3399 0.7455 -1.6083 
Tax 0.0141 0.0115 0.0107 0.0100 -1.8297 
Leverage 0.1870 0.2739 0.2946 0.8597 2.0111" 
Debt: Equity ratio 
Investment 0.2465 0.2071 0.2093 0.2174 -1.1393 
Expenditure 
Free Cash Flow 0.0623953 0.0472 -0.1902 0.6643 -2.4914" 
q 0.6427399 2.7117 1.8765 3.4642 2.2896 
Size 13.37482 1.7926 13.1608 1.5145 -0.7651 
Stock Performance -0.0074 0.0238 -0.00137 0.0421 0.9287 
Market Share 0.0090729 0.0124 0.0071 0.0126 -1.0265 
Turnover (Market) 91094.46 177865.4 198563.3 712006.8 2.7724" 
Market Return 0.0273197 0.0240 0.0148249 0.0428 -3.1041_ 
Turnover 3511.978 5805.646 3033.148 16550.46 -0.4374 
(Stock) 
Stock Return 0.0240905 0.0098 0.0161 0.0148 -4.9604… 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5 Comparison of Going-Private and Bankruptcy Samples 
Private Sample Bankruptcy Sample 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. t-value 
Profitability 0.2255 0.2451 -0.0807 0.3159207 -4.2031 … 
Growth 0.5299 0.8088 0.1133 0.2909175 -2.2289" 
Tax 0.0141 0.0115 0.0073 0.0065092 -2.9875… 
Leverage 0.1870 0.2739 0.4419 0.6231095 1.7925 
Debt: Equity ratio 
Investment 0.2465 0.2071 0.1720 0.1772 -1.4924 
Expenditure 
Free Cash Flow 0.0623953 0.0472 -0.3387 0.9951 -2.6620" 
q 0.6427399 2.7117 1.8952 1.5867 1.9137 
Size 13.37482 1.7926 12.4903 2.8024 -1.3203 
Stock Performance -0.0074 0.0238 -0.0422 0.0739 3.5799'" 
Market Share 0.0090729 0.0124 0.0133 0.0224 -2.8121 … 
Turnover (Market) 91094.46 177865.4 32359.8 53354.52 -1.9898* 
Market Return 0.0273197 0.0240 0.0148 0.0428 -3.1041 … 
TXirnover 3511.978 5805.646 631.2467 641.2411 -3.2139*" 
(Stock) 
Stock Return 0.0240905 0.0098 0.0234 0.0074 -0.3014 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5 Comparison of Going-Private and Bankruptcy Samples 
Private Sample M&A Sample 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. t-value 
Profitability 0.2255 0.2451 0.0660 0.1687 -2.9219… 
Growth 0.5299 0.8088 0.7973 1.8802 0.8182 
Tax 0.0141 0.0115 0.0138 0.0200 -0.0585 
Leverage 0.1870 0.2739 0.1522 0.1996 -0.6086 
Debt: Equity ratio 
Investment 0.2465 0.2071 0.1765 0.2326 -1.2627 
Expenditure 
Free Cash Flow 0.0623953 0.0472 0.0215 0.1196 -1.9887* 
q 0.6427399 2.7117 2.9078 3.2774 3.1058… 
Size 13.37482 1.7926 13.0448 2.0847 -0.6709 
Stock Performance -0.0074 0.0238 0.0097 0.0456 2.04广 
Market Share 0.0090729 0.0124 0.0250 0.0272 2.8170… 
Turnover (Market) 91094.46 177865.4 176318.3 623778.9 0.6801 
Market Return 0.0273197 0.0240 0.0235 0.0048 -0.2875 
TXirnover 3511.978 5805.646 10065.73 29727.74 1.1114 
(Stock) 
Stock Return 0.0240905 0.0098 0.0333 0.0439 0.6399 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 7 Survival Distribution across Industries 
Industry Obj. Survival rate Survival rate Survival rate 10 Survival rates 15 
N 2 years 5 years years years 
UTILITIES 18 1.0000 0.8462 0.6663 0.4760 
PROPERTIES 129 1.0000 0.9827 0.8726 0.7961 
CONSOLIDATED 255 1.0000 0.9765 0.8997 0.8163 
ENTERPRISES 
INDUSTRIALS 313 1.0000 0.9848 0.9041 0.8324 
HOTELS 20 1.0000 1.0000 0.8235 0.6373 
OTHERS U 1.0000 ^ 0.5303 0.5303 
TOTAL 748 1.0000 0.9793 0.8702 0.7769 
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Table 8 Determinants of Firm Survival 
Regression results f rom the Proportional Hazard Model (n=748) 
SPECIFICATION 
I II III 
Profitability 2.747573*** 2.957834** 2.389442*** 
Growth 0.2266691** 0.2568904 0.279*** 
Size 0.2674715*** 0.3745612*** 0.3014*** 
Turnover (M) -0.0015*** -0.00166* -0.0016* 
Turnover (S) 0.0197** 0.01837* 0.0158 
Stock performance -13.34596*** -6.5768*** -13.92981*** 






^inL 499.68 488.318 494.803 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 9 Determinants of Firm Survival 
Regression results from the Exponential and Weibull Model without Heterogeneity 
Variable Exponential Weibull 
O o ^ P>|z| Coef. P>|z| 
Profitability 2.6032 0 3.0453 0 
Growth 0.2069 0.02 0.2268 0.01 
Size 0.1994 0.012 0.2824 0 
Turnover (M) -0.0015 0.004 -0.00163 0.002 
Turnover (S) 0.0248 0.002 0.0218 0.01 
Stock performance -8.7477 0.008 -14.0014 0 
Constants -7.2641 0 -10.9087 0 
theta 1.97352 
—-InL ~~272.4235 247.1173 
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Table 10 Regression Results f rom all Duration Models with Gamma Heterogeneity 
Variable Cox PH Exponential Weibull 
Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Profitability -0.14257 -0.0456 -0.1724 
Growth 0.0479 0.03369 0.07615 
Size 0.0009314 0.00446 -0.0024 
Turnover (M) -0.000033 0.0000176 0.000017 
-0.0057 -0.0035 -0.0065 
Turnover (S) 
Stock -3.8579 -1.2918 -5.4298 
performance 
FCF 0.2157 0.1315 0.1976 
Tax -6.8543 -3.7680 -4.1335 
q 0.0408 0.02140 0.0437 
Leverage -0.1275 -0.0974 -0.0746 
Investment -0.1422 -0.1384 -0.2425 
Constants NA -0.1384** -0.2425*** 
theta 2.5516*** 2.4582*** 2.6211*** 
_ _ - i n L 331.91486 108.8778 67.537495 — 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 11 Determinants of F i rms ' Survival (CRM Model without Heterogeneity) 
SPECIFICATION I SPECIFICATION II 
RISK 
RISK FOR RISK FOR RISK FOR RISK FOR RISK FOR 
FOR 
BANKRUTCY PRATIZATION BANKRUTCY M&A PRVIATIZATION 
M&A 
PROFTABILITY ！ -3.0515*** 1.1989 4.9439*** -4.0443*** -8.3243 3.4121***~~ 
0.000 0.55 0 0.001 0.426 0 
GROWTH -0.9699 0.3095** 0.3105*** -1.2629 0.3638** 0.5734*** 
0.628 0.013 0.006 0.532 0.027 0 
SIZE 0.5173*** 0.1940 0.5300*** 0.6507*** 0.2093 0.5177*** 
0. 001 0.288 0 0.002 0.276 0 
TURNOVER -0.0051 -0.0011** -0.0019** -0.0046 -0.001** -0.0017** 
(MARKET) 
0.471 0.02 0.014 0.497 0.02 0.029 
TURNOVER .0.2964 0.0361*** 0.0042 -0.5475 0.02586* 0.0004 
(STOCK) 
0.193 0 0.72 0.096 0.009 0.93 
STOCK I -24.7409*** 12.1354** -5.928 -25.4560*** 12.0528* -9.9944 
PERFORMANCE | 
0 0.017 0.459 0 0.028 0.329 
FCF 0.3675 10.9011 15.0217*** 
0.274 0.314 0 
TAX 31.5831* 26.4934 -5.8077 
0.089 0.361 0.746 f 
q PROXY 0.1767*** 0.1231 -0.4449*** 
0.001 0.011 0 ^ 
LEVERAGE -0.1151 -1.3721 -1.3365* 
0.234 0.212 0.091 
INVESTMENT -0.3223 -1.4312 0.0621 
0.802 0.367 0.944 
- I n L “ 458.4366 416.3665 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 12 Determinants of F i rm's Survival (CRM Model with Heterogeneity) 
SPECIFICATION I SPECIFICATION II 
BANKRUTCY M&A PRIVATE BANKRUTCY M&A PRIVATE 
PROFTABILITY -3.0515*** 1.1989 4.8089*** -4.0443*** -8.3243 3.3639*** 
GROWTH -0.9699 0.3095*** 0.3141** -1.2629 0.3638** 0.5135*** 
SIZE 0.5173** 0.1941 0.5691*** 0.6507*** 0.2093 0.5431*** 
TURNOVER(M) - O ^ l -.0011801** -0.0019* -0.0046 -0.0011* -0.0017 
TURNOVER(S) -0.2964 0.0361*** 0.0050 -0.5475 0.0258** 0.0011 
STOCK -24.7409*** 12.1353** -11.6351 -25.4561*** 12.0528** -15.6056** 
PERFORMANCE 
FCF 0.36751 10.9011 14.7894*** 
TAX 31.5831 26.4934 -4.1489 
q PROXY 0.1767* 0.12316** -0.4229*** 
LEVERAGE -0.1151 -1.3721 -1.2611* 
INVESTMENT -0.3223 -1.4312 0.1066 
theta 2.11e-16 2.11e-16 0.1638* 2.11e-16 2.11e-16 0.1173 
- I n L 456.8605 421.1978 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 13 Summary Statistics on New Lists' Duration 
Existing Type Full Sample Bankruptcy M&A Going Private 
Failed 47 9 12 ^ 
Censored 530 
Mean 7.64991 7.44444 9.41667 7.269231 
Min 1 4 3 2 
M ^ ^ 13 14 15 
Std 4.31311 3.20590 4.33712 3.34135 
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Table 14 Determinants of New Lists ' Survival (CRM Model without Heterogeneity) 
RISK F O R RISK F O R RISK F O R 
BANKRUTCY |M&A |pRATIZATION 
Coef. Coef. Coef 
PROFTABILITY -4.4447*** -35.9983** 4.1963*** 
GROWTH -1.6741* 1.0958*** 0.6401*** 
SIZE 0.6145* 0.7172* 0.5634*** 
TURNOVER(MARKET)-0-_3 ^ ^ 
TURNOVER(STOCK) -0.3911 0.0043 -0.0056 
STOCK -12.7366 13.4557* -16.9729** 
PERFORMANCE 
FCF 0.5059* 42.9285** 13.8738*** 
TAX ^ . 9 8 2 6 64.1161 11.8803 
q PROXY 0.1467*** 0.1763*** -0.3886** 
LEVERAGE -1.5149*** -1.9267 -0.8838 
INVESTMENT 1.7926*** 0.8638 1.1821 
- I n L 192.7117 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
*• Significant at the 5% level. 
Significant at the 1% level. 
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Figure 1 Kaplan-Meier Estimates of Survival Function 
Kaplan-Meier Survival Function (by year) 
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Figure 2 Kaplan-Meier Estimates of Hazard Function 
Kaplan-Meier Hazard Function (by year) 
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Figure 3 Comparison of Survival Functions between Exits for Going Private and 
Other Exits 
Kaplan-Meier Survival Function(by year) 
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Figure 4 Comparison of Hazard Functions between Exits for Going private and 
Bankruptcy 
Kaplan-Meier Hazard Function (by year) ；;3 umMM^^^ 
；,w m ^ ^ r n m ^ ^^^ 
0 . 0 5 ， ？ 、 々 … ？ ！ 巧 如 f — " " “ 
0 5 10 >、烛 f鳴'、">25 
-0. 05 — — ^ 
Duration 
54 
Figure 5 Comparison of Hazard Functions between Exits for Going private and 
M&A 
Kaplan-Meier Hazard Function (by year) 
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Note: H-Profit denotes the companies whose profitability is higher than the median of the 
whole sample. L-Profit denotes the group with a lower profitability. 
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Figure 7 Survival Function Estimates by Growth Status 
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Note: H-Growth denotes the companies whose growth rate is higher than the median of the 
whole sample. L-Profit denotes the group with a lower growth rate. 
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Figure 10 C o n d i t i o n a l Hazard Function of Competing Risk Model 
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Figure 10 Conditional Hazard Function of Competing Risk Model 
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Figure 10 Conditional Hazard Function of Competing Risk Model 
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